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RECENT CRIMINAL CASES
Edited by the
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C. IVEs WALDO, JR., Case Editor

IMPROPER CONDUCT OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY AS GROUND FOR RE-

VFRSAL.-[Federal]

Defendant was

charged with conspiracy to utter
counterfeit notes. There was persistent misconduct during the trial

on the part of the United States
Attorney in connection with his
cross-examination of witnesses and

his argument to the jury. At the
conclusion of the evidence defendant moved to dismiss the indictment
on the ground that the evidence was
insufficient to support the charge.
The motion was denied and defendant sentenced to imprisonment. The
court of appeals affirmed the judgment, holding that the conduct of

the prosecuting attorney, although
to be condemned, was not sufficiently
grave to affect the fairness of the
trial. Held: on appeal, reversed.
Though the trial judge sustained
objections to some of.the questions,
insinuations and misstatements, and
instructed the jury to disregard
them, it was impossible to say that
the defendant was not prejudiced
thereby, especially in view of the

fact that the state's case was a weak
one: Berger v. United States (1935)
55 S. Ct. 629.
This decision represents a step
toward curbing the unnecessary and
unethical practices of attorneys in
creating false impressions and prejudices in order to win cases or ob-

tain convictions. Such practices are
to be condemned particularly in the
case of prosecuting attorneys. In
Fitter v. U. S. (C. C. A. 2d, 1919)
258 Fed. 567, the court said that
language which might be permitted
counsel in summing up a civil action cannot with propriety be used
by a public prosecutor, who is a
quasi-judicial officer, and whose duty
it is to act in the interest of justice. However, since the evidence
of guilt was so overwhelming in that
case, the language of the prosecutor
was held harmless. In the instant
case there was some doubt as to the
defendant's complicity in the crime,
and under such circumstances the
courts are less reluctant in reversing because of the prosecutor's misconduct: Chadwick v. U. S. (C. C.
A. 6th, 1905) 141 Fed. 225; Johnson
v. U. S. (C. C. A. 7th, 1914) 215
Fed. 679; Diggs v. U. S. (C. C. A.
9th, 1915) 220 Fed. 545; People v.
Pilewski (1920) 295 Ill. 58, 128 N.
E. 801.
The extreme view of what an attorney may do in advocating his
client's cause, expressed by Lord
Brougham in his defense of Queen
Caroline is accepted at the present
time by most criminal lawyers-"An
advocate by the sacred duty he owes
his client, knows, in the discharge
of that office, but one person in the
world, that client and none other.

[276]
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To save that client by all expedient
means-to protect that client at all
hazards and costs to others, and
among others to himself-is the
highest and most unquestioned of
his duties; and he must not regard
the alarm, the suffering, the torment he may bring upon any other."
A similar zeal in behalf of the State
is apt to cause a prosecutor to forget his duty to give the accused a
fair trial. The defendant's attorney is too prone to be interested
merely in his. reputation as an acquittal getter, the prosecutor in his
personal "batting average" or record
of convictions. Both too often forget that they are officers of the
court. Trials degenerate into personal combats, and the man with
the most spectacular display of verbal pyrotechnics stands to win. The
administration of justice as the ultimate end is disregarded in the heat
of the combat.
Experience shows that there is
bound to be difficulty restraining attorneys who are once allowed leeway in the use of language. Nevertheless there seems to be a definite
sanction for a judicious use of armwaiving and railing accusation by
prosecuting attorneys: Chadwick v.
U. S., supra. In Johnson v. U. S.
(C. C. A. 9th, 1907) 154 Fed. 445,
it was recognized that prejudicial
language was to be discountenanced,
but the court said, "--invective based
on the evidence and inferences
legitimately to be derived therefrom
are not inhibited, and it is usually
within the discretion of the trial
court to determine whether or not
the limits of that discretion are being exceeded." Some cases hold that
an instruction from the judge that
the jury disregard the remarks of
counsel is sufficient to protect the
interests of the defendant, though
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in the instant case there was a reversal despite the judge's instruction: Diggs v. U. S., supra; Dunlop
v. U. S. (1896) 165 U. S. 486, 17
S. Ct. 375. Such courts tend to hold
that the initiative in preventing improper conduct is upon the opposing
counsel who should object to the
court. The better view is that the
trial judge has the power and duty,
even in absence of any objection, to
stop and reprimand the overzealous
counsel, or even discharge the jury
if necessary. It is a delicate and
irksome duty for a lawyer to interrupt and censure his opponent in the
midst of his are-ument, and the court
should relieve him of this duty as
much as possible: Union Pacific Ry.
Co. v. Field (C. C. A. 8th, 1905) 157
Fed. 14; N. Y. C. R. R. Co. v. Johnson (1928) 279 U. S. 310, 49 S. Ct.
300; Brasefield v. U. S. (1926) 272
U. S. 448, 47 S. Ct. 135.
The leniency of some courts 'in
regard to conduct of counsel is to
be decried, and a mere glance at
the cases illustrates the untoward
actions which such weakness fosters.
In Johnson v. U. S., supra, the prosecutor in a white slave act action
against a negro defendant deliberately charged that the defendant
forced the white woman to commit
a crime against nature on his body,
thofigh there was no substantiating
evidence brought forth. The prosecuting attorney in People v. Esposito

(1918) 224 N. Y. 370, 121 N. E. 344,
attempted to sway the jury in a
murder prosecution by inferring
that defendant's surname was the
word for one of uncertain parentage
in defendant's native tongue. Appeals to race prejudice, bullying of
witnesses, improper innuendoes, and
similar misconduct are everyday
events in the courts. In the instant
case the prosecutor, among other
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things, deliberately misconstrued
defendant's answer to one of his
questions so as to convey to the
jury the impression that defendant
had threatened to kill him. Such
conduct must be prevented in the
future, and language like that of
Sutherlafid, J., will tend to do so.
"The.United States attorney is the
representative of a sovereignty
whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all, and wriose interest, therefore, in a criminal
prosecution is not that it shall win
a case but that justice shall be done.
. . . While he may strike hard
blows he is not at liberty to strike
foul ones." It is submitted that
other courts of appeal should follow
the language of this opinion in reviewing cases where the trial court
has been unsuccessful in preventing
misconduct of counsel at its inception.
EUGENE KART.

ASSAULT

AND

BATTERY-NECES-

SITY OP PRESENCE AT TIME OF AssAULT.-[Minnesota]
The defendant was a member of the Twin Cities
Cleaners' and Dyers' Association
which, upon failure to keep the complaining witness from entering the
cleaning business, tried to intimidate
him into joining the association. Defendant, representing the association, promised that, if he would join,
he would be compensated for damage previously done to his property.
The witness refused, whereupon the
defendant threatened him. A few
days later four gangsters entered
witness's shop, assaulted him, and
destroyed his property. Although
the state did not claim that defendant was present at the time, defendant was found guilty of assault un-

der Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1927)
§9917. Held: on appeal, affirmed.
The defendant need not be physically present at the time the assault
was committed where the connection
between him and those who committed the act is clear. State v.
Barnett (Minn. 1935) 258 N. W. 508.
At common law participants in
crime who were not present at the
commission of the crime could be
held on the principle of agency- or
accessory. There developed many
fine distinctions and technical rulings such as, "When one acts
through an agent, he can himself be
guilty as a principal in the first degree only when the agent is innocent. If the agent is legally responsible for his own acts, the instigator, who is not present when the
crime is committed, is only an accessory before the fact": Wixson v.
People (1860) 5 Parker Cr. Rep.
(N. Y.) 119; see Miller, "Criminal
Law" (1934) p. 229. An accessory
is one who though not present becomes guilty of an offense, not as
chief actor, but as a participator;
either before or after the fact or
concealment: B1. Comm. (Sharswood) VII, 4, pp. 33-4. For one to
be an accessory before the fact it is
necessary that he be absent at the
time the crime is committed: Williams v. State (1874) 47 Ind. 567.
At common law, a principal in the
first degree is he who is the absolute
perpetrator of the crime; and a
principal in the second degree is he
who is present aiding and abetting
the fact to be done: Bl. Comm.,
supra. The presence of the principal
in the second degree could be constructive: U. S. v. Boyd (C. C. W.
D. Ark. 1890) 45 Fed. 851; Brannon
v. People (1854) 15 Ill. 511. Though
distinctions such as these are still
in existence and often referred to
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by courts, they are in many jurisdictions abrogated by statute making
all who aid and assist accessories
and treating them as principals. E.
g., Ill. Stat. (S. H.) ch. 38, §582.
A more effective way than the
common law manner of dealing with
such criminals has developed by the
use of the conspiracy doctrine,
whereby all those associated in
crime may be convicted for an act
perpetrated by one of the conspirators. In McMahon v. People (1901)
189 Ill. 222, 59 N. E. 584, two men
went to a house with the intent to
commit burglary. They were discovered and while fleeing one of
them shot a policeman. The court,
in holding the defendant guilty on
the basis of conspiracy, said, "All
who enter into and participate in
the common object for which they
combine together will be guilty of
murder." Similarly where a prison
guard was killed in a conspiracy to
escape, the defendant was found
guilty of murder as a principal
though the evidence did not establish who had actually killed the
guard. It was held that the wilful
killing was the natural result of the
conspiracy: People v. Creeks (1915)
120 Cal. 368, 149 Pac. 821. There
the court, referring to People v.
Kauffman (1907) 152 Cal. 331, 92
Pac. 861, said, "If several parties
conspire or combine together to commit any unlawful act, each is criminally responsible for the acts of
his associates or confederates committed in furtherance of any prosecution of the common design for
which they combine." The general
rule is that the act of one is the act
of all.
Conspiracy may not only be used
to hold members of a band who did
not actually commit the offense, but
it is a substantive crime in itself
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which becomes useful when it is difficult to convict for a specific crime.
In a case where the defendants as
officers of a union which had called
a strike conspired to extort money
from the owners of a restaurant the
court, in holding them all guilty of
conspiracy, said, "It is only necessary to show that the plaintiffs in
error, either by acting together or
separately, pursued a course tending
toward the accomplishment of the
object of which complaint is made":
People v. Walczak (1925) 315 Ill.
49, 145 N. E. 660. The gist of a
conspiracy is the unlawful concurrence of two or more persons in a
wicked scheme:
State v. Ritter
(1929) 197 N. C. 113, 147 S. E.
755.
In the instant case, however, this
technique was not followed. The
court instead used conspiracy to convict the defendant of assault on the
theory that "Every person involved
in a conspiracy is deemed, in law,
a party to all the acts done by any
of the others in furtherance of a
common design": People v. Walczak, supra.
The use of conspiracy in this
manner has been facilitated in many
states by means of statutes. The
statute under which this defendant
was convicted reads: "Every person concerned in the commission of
a crime, whether he directly commits the act constituting the offense, or aids and abets in its commission, and whether present or
absent, and every person who directly or indirectly counsels, encourages, hires, commands, induces,
or otherwise procures another to
commit a crime, is a principal, and
shall be indicted and punished as
such": Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1927)
§9917.
Where there is a common design
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or purpose to effect an illegal act,
the presence of the accused at the
time of its commission is not essential: Mason v. State (1892) 31
Tex. Cr. Rep. 306, 20 S. W. 564;
Handley v. State (1902) 115 Ga. 584,
41 S. E. 992. In a case where the
indictment charged that the defendant did "with force and arms kidnap one Robert Wallace--" the defendant was found guilty though he
was not present when the act complained of took place. The court
said, "Procuring the intoxication of
Wallace, with the design of getting
him on board the ship in that condition without his consent-was a
kidnapping-; and it was immaterial
whether the prisoner did the acts
in person, or caused or advised their
being done": Hadden v. People
(1862) 25 N. Y. 373. In State v.
Hamilton (1878) 13 Nev. 386, the
defendant was convicted along with
those who had actually attempted
tc rob a stagecoach though he was
forty miles away on a mountain
where he had remained to signal to
his confederates the departure of
the stage. The court said, "Where
several confederates act in pursuance of a common plan, in the commission of an offense, all are held
to be present where the offense is
committed, and all are principals."
It has been held that persons who
counsel or encourage suicide are
guilty of murder: People v. Roberts
(1920) 211 Mich. 187, 178 N. W.
690; McMahon v. State (1910) 168
Ala. 70, 53 So. 89. In the latter
case it was said, "The statute-relegates to the class of principal-all
persons concerned in the commission of a felony, whether they directly commit the act, or aid, or
abet in its commission, though not
present." A person who hires or
commands another to commit a
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crime is held as a principal. Where
a bedridden cripple told his minor
son to place arsenic in the food of
his intended victim, the courts said
that the son was merely an instrument through which the father
worked and would no more relieve
the father of the crime than would
an inanimate object: Collins v.
State (1870) 50 Tenn. 14.
It is evident from the terms of
the Minnesota statute that every
one concerned with a crime is to be
held equally responsible. The statute is very broad and flexible in its
terms and thus enables the prosecutor to reach the gang leaders and
racketeers who direct the work but
never are present when the crime is
committed.

W. H.
KIDNAPPING -

THOMAS.

FORCING

FUGITIVE

TO CROSS INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY.
-[Federal]
A reward of seven hundred fifty dollars was offered for the
arrest in the United States of one
Lopez, a bond-defaulter who had
fled to Mexico. Petitioner arranged
with certain individuals in that
country to seize Lopez, and carry
him forcibly to the Rio Grande, on
the other side of which petitioner
awaited him with drawn revolver.
Steps were immediately taken by the
Mexican government to extradite
Villareal, the petitioner, and to try
him for the kidnapping of Lopez.
The petitioner sought to obtain his
freedom by means of a writ of
habeas corpus, claiming that the acts
alleged did not constitute the crime
of kidnapping, either as defined by
the treaty or by the Mexican statute. The petitioner appeals from an
order denying the writ. Held: on
appeal, affirmed. The acts charged
would constitute the offense under
either definition: Villareal v. Ham-
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mond, Marshal (C. C. A. 5th, 1934)
74 F. (2d) 503.
Kidnapping is the exaggerated
form of false imprisonment:
1
Bishop, "Criminal Law" (9th ed.
1923) §553, 2 id., §750. This definition of the crime, as recognized
at common law, has been considerably elaborated by statute in the
several states, but where an arrest
has been unlawful at its inception,
it is almost universally recognized
that, as a matter of law, apparently
commendable motives for the seizure
or the good faith of the defendant
do not constitute a valid defense.
In Collier v. Vaccaro (C. C.
A. 4th, 1931) 51 F. (2d) 17, the
defendant was acting under a
friendly agreement between the
United States and Canada in
an effort to stop the narcotic traffic. A suspect was waiting just
over the border on the Canadian
side when the defendant arrested
an accomplice making a delivery of
narcotics in the United States. The
latter agreed to entice the suspect
over the national boundary, but,
when within hailing distance of the
suspect, warned him of the impending arrest. Thereupon defendant
pursued the suspect, overpowered
him, and carried him forcibly back
into the United States. The court
held that, regardless of the legality
of the arrest, the act constituted an
extraditable offense, since the gist
of the action was the forcible carrying out of the state. Even when
the arrest itself is lawful, the act
may constitute a kidnapping if the
arresting officer does not follow
strictly the law or process under
which the arrest is consummated.
Thus, in People v. Fick (1891) 89
Cal. 144, 26 Pac. 759, the conviction
of the arresting officer for kidnapping was affirmed. He arrested, un-

der color of valid process, one Toy
Fong, a Chinese woman; but instead of incarcerating her in the
county jail as was his duty, he
placed her for several days in a
house of ill-repute operated by one
"China Molly." The court approved
the doctrine laid down in the Massachusetts cases: "One who arrests
the person of another by legal process, or other equivalent authority
conferred upon him by law, can only
justify himself by a strict compliance with the requirements of such
process or authority. If he fails to
execute or return the process as
thereby required, or to do what the
law required him to do in making
the arrest, his whole justification
fails." Brock v. Stimson (1871)
108 Mass. 520; Phillips v. Fadden
(1878) 125 Mass. 198.
Intent, beyond an intent to do the
acts proven, is unimportant in the
crime of kidnapping, and the fact
that the defendant thought he was
acting well within his legal rights
does not excuse the crime. In People v. Sheasbey (Cal. App. 1921)
255 Pac. 836, the defendant had sold
the prosecuting witness a quantity
of household goods on deferred payments. There was some claim that
they weren't satisfactory, and the
prosecuting witness refused to pay
for them. Defendant called with his
men at the home of the purchaser
at a time when he thought the latter
would be out, intending to take back
the goods and avoid further trouble.
However, the prosecuting witness
was at home, and defendant, reasonably believing that the former was
going to get his gun and prevent the
removal of the goods, had him
bound while the removal was being
made. He then took the bound purchaser back to town with him, there
releasing him. The defendant was
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convicted of robbery and kidnapping.
The conviction for robbery was, of
course, reversed, but the kidnapping
conviction was affirmed, the court
saying that intent by itself constitutes no defense to the crime of
kidnapping, and where no circumstances are proven which would
constitute a lawful excuse, no intent
is necessary. A defendant has been
convicted of kidnapping where, by
a display of violence, he intimidated
his wife, and, over her objections,
forced her to accompany him around
the state: State v. Kay (1933) 176
La. 294, 145 So. 544.
The petitioner in the instant case,
then, was clearly guilty of kidnapping. By intimidation and violence,
he forced Lopez to leave his asylum
and return to the United States,
where a reward was offered for his
arrest. Since intent is unimportant,
the fact that Villareal intended to
surrender Lopez to the proper authorities is unavailing to him as a
defense.
The position of the fugitive thus
illegally forced to return from his
asylum is analogous to that of a defendant against whom evidence has
been obtained illegally. At common law, the latter could not successfully object to the introduction
of such evidence, the court holding
that the defendant had his remedy,
either civil or criminal, against the
persons guilty of the unlawful act,
but that courts would receive otherwise admissible evidence, when presented, without investigating the
means by which it was obtained:
People v. Defore (1926) 242 N. Y.
413, 150 N. E. 585. The former
cannot plead in bar of a prosecution the fact that he was brought
within the jurisdiction unlawfully;
this is true whether the fugitive has
been forced to cross an international
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or an interstate boundary: Ker v.
Illinois (1886) 119 U. S. 436, 7 S.
Ct. 225; People v. Pratt (1889) 78
Cal. 345, 20 Pac. 731; State v. Brewster (1835) 7 Vt. 118; Ex parte
Ponzi (1927) 106 Tex. Cr. Rep. 58,
290 S. W. 170; State v. Ross and
Mann (1906) 12 Idaho 250, 85 Pac.
897; Leahy v. Kunkel (N. D. Ind.
1933) 4 Fed. Supp. 849. See 24 J.
Crim. L. 1104.
In Leahy v. Kunkel, supra the petitioner, a resident of Chicago, was
indicted for bank robbery in Indiana. While in his Chicago home,
a sheriff from Indiana and several
police officers seized him, put him in
the former's car, and drive him
over the state line, all this without
warrant or color of legal sanction.
The court said: "There can be no
doubt that the acts of the officers
were wrong, were without the pale
of judicial approval and should not
be condoned or encouraged. But
these officers are not before this
court, and the only question up
for decision is the alleged right of
the prisoner to be discharged because of the wrongful manner of
his having been brought into court
to answer the charge with which he
stands indicted."
Thus, although undoubtedly an officer so acting would be guilty of
kidnapping, this fact cannot avail
the defendant
thus unlawfully
brought within .the jurisdiction of
the court.

FRANcIS D.

ROTH.

Ho IcDE-EvIDENCE To BE CONSIDERED BY JURY IN MITIGATION OF

PuNIsHmENT.-[New Jersey] The
defendant was indicted for a murder committed while attempting to
rob a store. On the trial he admitted his guilt, all of the evidence
for the defense being directed to
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obtaining from the jury a recommendation of life imprisonment.
Evidence offered by the defendant
concerning his past life and rearing, his listening to stories of the
great war, and his playing of games
involving the handling of firearms
was excluded. The jury found the
defendant guilty of murder in the
first degree without recommendation
of life imprisonment, and he appealed, assigning as error the exclusion of this testimony. Held:
on appeal, affirmed. The trial court
properly excluded evidence as to the
defendant's past life, for the only
evidence that can be considered by
the jury on the question of recommending life imprisonment is the
evidence adduced on the issue of
guilt or innocence: State v. Barth
(N. J. 1935) 176 Atl. 183.
In New Jersey the jury is authorized by statute to recommend life
imprisonment when the defendant
is found guilty of murder in the
first degree, and such a recommendation is binding on the court:
N. J. Comp. Stat. (Supp. 1924)
§§52-107. In that state and other
states having similar statutes the
courts hold that the question of
whether or not such a recommendation shall be made is a matter within the discretion of the jury: Green
v. State (1927) 93 Fla. 1076, 113
So. 121; Aiken v. State (1930) 170
Ga. 895, 154 S. E. 368; State v.
Martin (1919) 92 N. J. Law 436,
106 Atl. 385; Howell v. State (1921)
102 Ohio 411, 131 N. E. 706; State
v. King (1930) 158 S. C. 251, 296,
155 S. E. 409 Under such statutes
some of the courts have held that
any instruction by the trial court
requiring the jury's recommendation
to be based on the evidence, or suggesting a cause for which the jury
mpay or ought to exercise its discre-

tion is erroneous: State v. King,
supra; Cohen v. State (1902) 116
Ga. 573, 42 S. E. 781. In other
jurisdictions, while a recommendation of life imprisonment is said to
be within the sound discretion of
the jury, the rule is that this discretion may be exercised only where
the evidence discloses palliating circumstances: Howell v. State, supra.
There are several states where
by statute the jury may in capital
cases recommend mercy, such recommendation not being binding on
the court: Del. Laws (1917) c. 266;
N. M. Stat. (1929) c. 105, §2226;
Utah Rev. Stat. (1933) tit. 103, c.
28, §4. The courts in these states
consistently hold that while the
power to recommend mercy is within the discretion of the jury, it
should only be exercised where the
facts and circumstances as disclosed by the evidence warrant such
a recommendation: State v. Galvano (1930) 34 Del. 409, 154 Atl.
461; State v. Knight (1929) 34 N.
M. 217, 279 Pac. 947; State v. Woods
(1923) 62 Utah 392, 220 Pac. 215.
The statutes in other states authorize the jury not merely to make
a recommendation, but to fix the
punishment in cases of first degree
murder: Pa. Stat. Anno. (Purdon,
1930) tit. 18, §2222; Cal. Penal Code
(Deering, 1931) §190; Ariz.'Code
(Struckmeyer, 1928) §4585; Tenn.
Code
Anno.
(Williams,
1934)
§10772; Miss. Code (1930) §1293;
111. Rev. Stat. (Cahill, 1933) c. 38,
§360; Ala. Code (Michie, 1928)
§4458. In these states it is held that
the matter of punishment, within
the limits stated in the statute, rests
in the discretion of the jury: Mays
v. State (1920) 143 Tenn. 443, 226
S. W. 233; People v. Heffernan
(1924) 312 Ill. 66, 143 N. E. 411.
Some courts follow the doctrine that
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the jury's power to fix the punishment is absolute, and it is error for
the trial court to instruct the jury
as to the exercise of its discretion:
Hernandez v. State (Ariz. 1934) 32
P. (2d) 18; Brister v. State (1926)
143 Miss. 689, 109 So. 728. The
California court refuses to adopt
such a view and holds that the
power of the jury is not an arbitrary one, but is to be exercised
only when the jury is satisfied from
the evidence that the lighter penalty
should be imposed: People v. Craig
(1925) 196 Cal. 19, 235 Pac. 721. It
may be readily conceded that the
more rational view is that statutes
giving the jury the power to recommend life imprisonment or mercy,
or to fix the penalty in murder
cases, vest in the jury a discretion
to be exercised only after a consideration of all the evidence and
not arbitrarily.
The question here involved is
whether the legislature in enacting
such statutes intended to open the
door to a new field of evidence,
other than that presented on the issue of guilt or innocence, to be considered by the jury in determining
the punishment. The New Jersey
court in State v. James (1921) 96
N. J. Law 134, 114 Atl. 553, refused to allow the admission of evidence of the prisoner's family history to show a taint of insanity
which the prisoner must have inherited, the evidence being offered
in palliation of the punishment. The
court, in considering the statute
which provides that the jury's recommendation is to be made "after
a consideration of all the evidence,"
said that "the legislature could never
have intended to open the door to
the trial of a collateral issue such
as insanity in the family of the prisoner who has not pleaded insanity
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in himself as a defense in bar." It
was also said that the statutory
phrase "all the evidence" meant "all
the evidence adduced between the
state and the prisoner on the issue
of guilt or innocence." However,
the latter is a purely gratuitous assumption, for the history of this
statutory phrase shows that there is
no reason for the court to limit the
jury's consideration to the evidence
on the issue of guilt or innocence
alone. The legislature amended a
former statute so as to include this
phrase as the result of the decision
in State v. Martin, supra, where
the court held that the jury's recommendation was absolutely discretionary, and that an instruction to the
jury that they should consider testimony tending to show the character
of the crime constituted reversible
error. The motive of the legislature in amending the statute was undoubtedly to rebut the proposition
that the power of the jury was arbitrary and capricious and to embody the principle that the jury's
recommendation must be founded
on some factual basis, and it was
not the legislative intent that the
evidence on the issue raised by the
indictment and plea should be the
only basis for such a recommendation.
In the case of Commonwealth v.
Williams (1932) 307 Pa. 122, 160
Atl. 602, the Pennsylvania court considers the problem of what evidence
the legislature intended should be
a guide for the jury in determining
the quantum of punishment. This
court had previously held that the
state might offer a criminal record
in aggravation of the penalty, so
the defendant contended he should
therefore be able to show specific
Th e
mitigating circumstances.
court held that the defendant's pre-
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ferred evidence was properly excluded since the evidence showed a
deliberate planned murder with
profit as the motive, but it was recognized that "in a proper case"
mitigating circumstances might be
shown. The opinion hardly seems
liberal enough on the facts, for, as
Professor Wigmore says: "When
the prosecution to aggravate the
sentence is allowed to show a conviction for crime or the like, the
accused should of course be allowed
to present all facts of character or
otherwise tending to rebut the aggravation and to induce mitigation":
Wigmore, "Evidence" (Supp. 1934)
§195. The California court in People v. Witt (1915) 170 Cal. 104, 148
Pac. 928, passed on the same problem, and held that the statute did
not contemplate the admission of
evidence as to matters not otherwise relevant to the issue of guilt or
innocence, but that the jury's determination is to be based solely on
such evidence as is presented on
this issue. However, in later cases
the California court has taken a
more liberal attitude. In People v.
Perry (1925) 195 Cal. 623, 640, 234
Pac. 890, and in People v. Dias
(1930) 210 Cal. 495, 292 Pac. 459,
the court said that evidence of the
defendant's mental weakness might
properly be considered by the jury
in determining the punishment. Then
in a recent case the same court
enunciated the doctrine that in a
murder case "the accused should as
against technical objections be permitted to state within reasonable
limitations something of his background" for the purpose of aiding
the jury in fixing the penalty: People v. Larrios (1934) 220 Cal. 236,
30 P. (2d) 404. There is some language in People v. Heffernan, supra,
indicating that the Illinois court is

disposed to follow the same liberal
view.
In deciding the question of punishment the jury should be allowed
to consider all evidence which is
material to its determination, including evidence in mitigation of
the penalty as well as evidence of
past crimes in aggravation. When
the judge proceeds to fix the sentence after a plea of guilty, his inquiry is not limited by the rules
applicable to jury trials in considering circumstances that should affect
mitigation or aggravation of the
penalty: People v. Popescue (1931)
345 Ill. 142, 177 N. E. 741. The
courts should come to the realization that under such statutes as the
one in the present case the jury is
performing a double function: (1)
determination of guilt (2) fixing of
punishment. The privilege of having a jury fix the punishment is no
part of the common law form of
trial by jury, but is a statutory in-.
novation by virtue of which the jury
is invested with a heretofore exclusively judicial function: Woods
v. State (1914) 130 Tenn. 100, 169
S. W. 558. In exercising this latter
function the jury should therefore
be accorded the same freedom in
considering evidence as that allowed
the judge in determining the sentence upon a plea of guilty.
It is necessary, however, that
there be some measure of restraint
to prevent confusion of issues. In
Coininonwealth v. Williams, supra,
the Pennsylvania court feared that
if such evidence as the defendant
had offered was admitted in mitigation of punishment, it would give
rise to no end of collateral issues.
This same difficulty troubles the
New Jersey court in the instant case
and leads it to suggest that such
matters as presented by the defend-
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ant's testimony are not relevant at
the trial but may only be considered
by the Court of Pardons. Professor
Wigmore has suggested that in
those states where evidence of past
crimes is admissible to aid the jury
in its determination of punishment,
such evidence should be reserved
till after a verdict of guilty has been
found and then submitted to the
jury for the purpose of a supplementary verdict on the question of
punishment so as not to prejudice
the jury in its determination of the
fact of guilt or innocence: Wigmore, "Evidence" (Supp. 1934)
§164b. Likewise evidence in mitigation of punishment should be sub-,
mitted to the jury only after it has
determined the guilt of the accused
so that it may render a supplementary verdict fixing the punishment.
This practice would prevent collateral issues from obscuring the
state's case on the issue of guilt or
innocense and would allow the consideration by the jury of all matters
essential to the proper exercise of
its statutory discretion. The legislature may by statute authorize such
a supplementary verdict for the
purpose of fixing the punishment or
recommending mercy, or, as Professor Wigmore believes, the courts
themselves may permit the use of a
supplementary verdict without waiting for legislative sanction, as the
matter of procedure is exclusively
within their own control: Wiqmore,
"Evidence" (Supp. 1934) §164b.
D. M. GRAHAM.

EMBEZZLEMENT-SALE

OF

BoNDS

TO TRuST ESTATE BY TRUSTEE AT A

PROFIT TO HIMSELF.-[Indiana] The
defendant cashier and trust officer
of a bank was convicted of embezzlement for having individually pur-

chased bonds and resold them to a
guardianship account at a large
profit to himself. Held: on appeal,
affirmed, regardless of honest belief
of defendant that he had a right to
make the sale at a profit to himself.
The law will not permit the guardian to profit at the expense of his
ward's estate, nor will it permit the
agent or employee of the guardian
to do so, under which rule the felonious intent necessary to sustain a
conviction for embezzlement is imputed to the very act itself: Yoder
v. State (Ind., 1935) 194 N. E. 645.
The crime of embezzlement was
unknown at common law, larceny
being the chief offense when the
unlawful taking of another's propSince,
erty was to be 'punished.
however, every larceny included a
trespass, no one lawfully in possession of property could commit
larceny thereof. Embezzlement is
a purely statutory offense, and its
essence is the violation of a fiduciary duty. Under the express terms
of some state statutes, the fraudulent conversion of money or other
property in the hands of a person
acting as executor or administrator,
guardian, or trustee, constitutes emThe statute under
bezzlement.
which the instant case was prosecuted gives no express name to the
offense, merely defining the types
of acts and providing the penalty for
the commission thereof. Ind. Stat.
Ann. (Burns, 1933) §§10-1712. The
Illinois Statute, as do many others,
differs only in that it provides that
the embezzler shall be deemed guilty
of larceny: Ill. Rev. Stat. (SmithHurd, 1933), c. 38, §210. The typical definition is given in Moore v.
United States (1895) 160 U. S. 268,
wherein embezzlement is said to
consist of the fraudulent appropriation of property by a person to
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whom it has been entrusted or to
whose hands it has lawfully come;
it is distinguished from larceny in
the fact that the original taking of
the property was lawful or with the
consent of the owner, while in larceny the felonious attempt must
have existed at the time of the
taking.
The instant decision emphasizes
the extremely high duty and degree
of good faith imposed in favor of
the cestui qui trust upon one occupying a fiduciary position. The defendant sought to evade conviction
upon the ground that he acted in
good faith fully believing that he
had a right to make the personally
profitable sale to the guardianship
estate. Nevertheless, the court invoked the "ignorance of the law is
no excuse" maxim and imputed the
intent necessary to sustain a conviction. This item of intent has
proven a difficult problem in varying types of cases wherein it is the
See
gravamen of the offense:
Comment (1931) 6 St. John's L.
Rev. 137. However, the established
law on the subject has been well
stated by Judge Keller in his oral
charge to the jury in United States
v. Breese (W. D. N. C., 1904), 131
Fed. 915, 922, rev. on other grounds
(C. C. A. 4th, 1906), 143 Fed. 250,
"Ordinarily the intent with which
a man does a criminal act is not proclaimed by him. Ordinarily there
is no direct evidence by which a
jury may be satisfied from the
declaration of the criminal himself
as to what he intended when he did
a certain act. .

.

. If a man knows

that the act he is about to commit
will naturally or necessarily have
the effect of injuring or defrauding
another and he voluntarily and intentionally does the act, he is chargeable in law, with the intent to in-
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jure or defraud." See also National L. & Acci. Ins. Co. v. Gibson
(1907) 31 Ky. 101, 101 S. W. 895;
State v. Cater (1934) 190 Minn.
485, 252 N. W. 421. The term
"intent" as used in most statutes
means nothing more than that
general intent to injure or defraud which is said always to
arise when one willfully or intentionally does that which isillegal or
fraudulent and which in its necessary and natural consequences must
injure another. In Phillips v.State
(1867) 29 Tex. 226 the court said,
"If a man intends to do what he is
conscious the law, which every one
is conclusively presumed to know,
forbids, there need not be any other
evil intent." Thus the law seems
to be well settled that the color of
the act, done with the knowledge of
its natural or necessary results, determines the complexion of the intent: United States v. Houghton
(D. C. N. J., 1882) 14 Fed. 544;
Spaulding v. People (1898) 172 Ill.
40, 49 N. E. 993. It is further held
that concealment is unnecessary and
there may be embezzlement where
the appropriation is openly made:
People v. Talbot (1934) 28 p. (2d)
1057, 220 Cal. 3. Thus we may resolve in accord with Crouse v. State
(1933) 163 Md. 431, 163 Atl. 699,
that actual felonious intent is not a
necessary element of the statutory
crime of embezzlement, such intent
being a conclusion of law from the
actual commission of the crime described in the statute.
The fact situation in the instant
case is without precedent in a crimCases wherein
inal prosecution.
corporate officers, agents, and others
occupying a fiduciary capacity have
been held guilty of embezzlement are
legion, but the common instance is
unlike the present case. The person
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charged usually, in a more direct
manner, has deliberately taken trust
funds for his own use and failed to
account therefor, or has misapplied
the funds for purposes other than a
sale of property by himself to the
trust estate. The reasoning of the
opinion is taken from civil cases allowing a recovery for "secret
profits" realized by fiduciaries in
their dealings for or with cestui
qui trust. There are many cases
wherein corporate directors and
others occupying a position of trust
have sold to themselves property belonging to the principal with a resulting personal gain: Chicago Hansom Cab Co. v. Ycrkes (1892) 141
Ill. 320, 30 N. E. 667. In such a
case the right to an accounting for
such gain is well established. More
in point is Parker v. Nickerson
(1873) 112 Mass. 195, wherein the
directors of a ferry company bought
a steamboat for themselves as individuals, and, so owning it, bought
it of themselves in their character
of directors for the company, at a
large advance upon its cost. This
transaction was held fraudulent as
against the company, and they were
held bound to restore to the company
the profits so made by them. In
Taylor v. Calvert (1894) 138 Ind.
67, 37 N. E. 531 it became the duty
of the guardian to buy a certain certificate of purchase in order to protect the ward's interest but the
guardian proceeded to make the investment for himself. The holding
in that case was to the effect that
whenever a guardian assumes a
position relation to his ward's funds,
by which he puts his personal interest in conflict with theirs, or acquires any interest or title adverse
to that of his wards, lie will not,
whether he intended any fraud or
not, be permitted to retain the ad-

vantage, but the same will inure to
the benefit of his wards, and he will
hold what he has acquired, in trust
for them, subject only to his right
to be reimbursed for what he has
invested. The rule as to a recovery
where a conflict of interests has
arisen is well stated in Thompson,
"Liability of Agents of Corporation"
(1880) ch. III, §8, p. 360: "It is a
familiar doctrine of the courts of
equity that a trustee will not be permitted, without the knowledge and
consent of his principal, to speculate
out of his trust, or to retain any
gain which may have accrued to him
personally therefrom, but that he
must account to his cestui qui trust
for all profits which he may make
out of the trust relation." It is a
familiar doctrine of equity that a
trustee cannot purchase or buy at
his own sale where such a conflict
of interests will result in a loss to
the trust estate: Thompson, op. cit.
supra, §9.
In both a civil proceeding for recovery as in Parker v. Nickerson,
supra and a criminal prosecution
for embezzlement as in Epperson v.
State (1887) 22 Tex. App. 694, 3
S. W. 789 the courts speak of a
fraudulent appropriation of the
property of another by a person to
whom it has been entrusted. Although the term is used in different
connections, it is, nevertheless, ever
present and it may be that such a
fact does reconcile the two types of
suit and justify the instant conviction of the criminal charge. The
same regal basis of fraud which
underlies the doctrines allowing recovery of "secret profits" or gain
involved in a conflict of interests,
has been applied to make the guardian acting in breach of faith criminallv liable. It is perhaps mere
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accident that cases involving an individually profitable sale by a fiduciary to the trust estate, have appeared only in suits for accounting
or recovery of the profit so realized,
but in any event the present case
furnishes an important contribution
in the merging of criminal prose-

cution under express statutory definitions with common law doctrines
imposing civil liability. The high
degree of care and good faith in
managing trust estates has thus
taken on a wider import by its application to criminal liability.
H. DON REYNOLDS.

